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For years, it has been the goal of the intelligence community to limit sharply or even put 
a stop to terrorism, be it through the prevention of attacks or apprehension of those 
seeking to commit such acts. While there has been some success, perhaps further 
progress could be made by incorporating techniques used by law enforcement into the 
intelligence process. Geographic profiling has been used successfully by law enforcement 
agencies to aid in the capture of serial criminals, and due to the similarities between the 
two, it is possible that geographic profiling could do the same against terrorists. In the 
case of the Abu Sayyaf group in the southern islands of Sulu and Basilan in the 
Philippines, geographic profiling techniques were partially successful in highlighting the 
possible future locations or types of incidents that would next be committed by the group. 
The success was limited, but while it may not be the next great breakthrough in the 
prevention of terrorist attacks, it appears to be another layer of analysis that can be 
incorporated into the intelligence cycle.   
 vi 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 vii 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
I. PREDICTING TERRORIST ACTION ....................................................................1 
A. PROBLEM STATEMENT .............................................................................1 
B. PURPOSE AND OBJECTIVES .....................................................................1 
C. METHODOLOGY ..........................................................................................2 
II. THE APPLICABILITY OF GEOGRAPHIC PROFILING TO TERRORIST 
ACTION........................................................................................................................5 
A. WHAT IS GEOGRAPHIC PROFILING? ....................................................5 
B. WHY SHOULD THE UNITED STATES EXPLORE EXPANDED 
UTILIZATION OF GEOGRAPHIC PROFILING? ...................................8 
C. SIMILARITIES BETWEEN SERIAL CRIMINALS AND 
TERRORISTS ................................................................................................10 
D. PREVIOUS ATTEMPTS TO APPLY GEOGRAPHIC PROFILING 
TO TERRORISM ..........................................................................................13 
III. GEOGRAPHIC PROFILING SOFTWARE AND CASE STUDY ......................15 
A. GEOGRAPHIC INFORMATION SYSTEMS ...........................................15 
B. CRIMESTAT .................................................................................................15 
C. THE DATA .....................................................................................................16 
D. THE ABU SAYYAF GROUP .......................................................................18 
IV. ANALYZING THE ABU SAYYAF GROUP’S ACTIVITIES .............................21 
A. RESULTS AND ANALYSIS ........................................................................21 
B. MICROSOFT EXCEL—ANALYZING HISTORICAL DATA FOR 
INCIDENT NUMBER AND TYPE .............................................................22 
C. HOT SPOT ANALYSIS ................................................................................36 
D. INCIDENT NORMALIZATION .................................................................52 
V. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION .......................................................................69 
A. DISCUSSION .................................................................................................69 
B. LIMITATIONS ..............................................................................................71 
C. CONCLUSIONS ............................................................................................72 
LIST OF REFERENCES ......................................................................................................75 




THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 ix 
LIST OF FIGURES 
Figure 1. Top Ten Locations for Incidents on Sulu, According to CrimeStat ................38 
Figure 2. Sulu 2008 Incidents Compared to 2001–2007 CrimeStat Hot Spots ...............40 
Figure 3. Top Seven Locations for Incidents on Basilan, According to CrimeStat ........42 
Figure 4. Basilan 2008 Incidents Compared to 2001–2007 CrimeStat Hot Spots ..........43 
Figure 5. ArcGIS Hot Spot Analysis of 2001–2007 Abu Sayyaf Group Sulu 
Incidents ...........................................................................................................45 
Figure 6. ArcGIS Hot Spot Analysis of 2001–2007 Abu Sayyaf Group Basilan 
Incidents ...........................................................................................................46 
Figure 7. 2008 Incidents Overlaid on ArcGIS Hot Spot Analysis of 2001–2007 Sulu 
Incidents ...........................................................................................................48 
Figure 8. 2008 Incidents Overlaid on ArcGIS Hot Spot Analysis of 2001–2007 
Basilan Incidents ..............................................................................................49 
Figure 9. Normalization of Municipality Incidents by Total Sulu Incidents: 2001–
2007..................................................................................................................54 
Figure 10. Normalization of Municipality Incidents by Total Sulu Incidents: 2008 ........55 
Figure 11. Normalization of Municipality Incidents by Total Basilan Incidents: 2001–
2007..................................................................................................................58 
Figure 12. Normalization of Municipality Incidents by Total Basilan Incidents: 2008 ....59 
Figure 13. Sulu 2001–2007 Incidents Normalized by Municipality Population ...............65 
Figure 14. Sulu 2008 Incidents Normalized by Municipality Population .........................65 
Figure 15. Basilan 2001–2007 Incidents Normalized by Municipality Population ..........66 
Figure 16. Basilan 2008 Incidents Normalized by Municipality Population ....................66 
 
 x 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 xi 
LIST OF TABLES 
Table 1. The Table Shows the Final Outcome from the AHP Analysis by Fox and 
Thompson. .......................................................................................................11 
Table 2. This Table Shows the Cumulative Percentages Generated through TOPSIS 
Analysis by Fox and Thompson. .....................................................................12 
Table 3. ASG-Initiated incidents in Mindanao: 2001–2008 ..........................................19 
Table 4. ASG-Initiated incidents in Mindanao: 2001–2008 (Grouped) ........................20 
Table 5. Sulu Incidents Broken Down by Year and Municipality .................................23 
Table 6. Basilan Incidents Broken Down by Year and Municipality ............................25 
Table 7. Sulu Incident Totals versus Basilan Incident Totals ........................................27 
Table 8. Incidents by Type per Year ..............................................................................29 
Table 9. Percentages of Incidents by Type per Year .....................................................32 
Table 10. Incidents by Type per Year (Groupings) .........................................................34 
Table 11. Percentages of Incidents by Year Per Type (Groupings) .................................35 
Table 12. Top Ten Most Frequent Locations of ASG Incidents ......................................37 
Table 13. Top Seven Most Frequent Locations of ASG Incidents ..................................41 
Table 14. Summary of Hot Spot Analysis from CrimeStat and ArcGIS .........................51 
Table 15. Normalization of Municipality Incidents by Total Sulu Incidents ..................53 
Table 16. Normalization Category Levels .......................................................................54 
Table 17. Normalization of Municipality Incidents by Total Basilan Incidents ..............57 
Table 18. Normalization Category Levels .......................................................................57 
Table 19. Sulu Island-Wide and Municipality-Level Normalization Values by Year .....60 
Table 20. Basilan Island-Wide and Municipality Level Normalization Values by 
Year ..................................................................................................................61 
Table 21. Normalization Values of Sulu Municipalities Based on 2001 to 2007 
Incidents ...........................................................................................................62 
Table 22. Normalization Values of Basilan Municipalities Based on 2001 to 2007 
Incidents ...........................................................................................................62 
Table 23. Normalization Values of Sulu Municipalities Based on 2008 Incidents .........63 
Table 24. Normalization Values of Basilan Municipalities Based on 2008 Incidents ....63 
Table 25. Normalization Categories ................................................................................64 
Table 26. Comparison of Sulu Normalization Categories ...............................................64 




THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 xiii 
LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS 
ARMM Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao 
ASG Abu Sayyaf group 
CGT criminal geographic targeting 
CORE  Common Operational Research Environment 
CRUSH Crime Reduction Utilizing Statistical History 
CTM Communist terrorist movements  
DNA deoxyribonucleic acid 
FBI  Federal Bureau of Investigation 
FTO Foreign Terrorist Organization 
GIS geographic information systems 
LE lawless elements 
MADM multi-attribute decision making 
MILF Moro Islamic Liberation Front 
MNLF Moro National Liberation Front 
NCTC National Counterterrorism Center 
NIJ National Institute of Justice 
OSC Open Source Center 
RCMP  Royal Canadian Mounted Police 
TOPSIS technique of order preference by similarity to ideal solution 
  
 xiv 




Thank you to the faculty and staff of the Defense Analysis Department and the 









I. PREDICTING TERRORIST ACTION 
A. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
While it may be difficult to disrupt a terrorist network, perhaps we can improve 
our ability to anticipate where and when the next attack will occur. The adaptation of 
terrorists in order to avoid detection has limited the number of characteristics that we can 
search for or track. If we cannot find the terrorists directly, we must focus our efforts on 
another strategy. One way that terrorist networks can be exploited is through the 
determination of when and where the organization will make its next attack. If 
counterterrorism forces have an idea of when and where the terrorists will attack, they 
can plan accordingly in terms of surveillance and security presence, which could lead to 
the prevention of said attack and/or the apprehension of its perpetrators before, during, or 
immediately following the commission of their act. While tactics and methods may have 
changed, the locations of these acts of terrorism have stayed more or less consistent over 
time, driven by available targets and opportunities as have the individual traits of the 
perpetrators. These anticipatable variables may be able to yield information concerning 
the potential whereabouts of both the terrorists as well as the locations of their next 
attacks.  How best might we combine these variables together in order to yield the 
possible locations of terrorists and/or their attacks? Is it possible that these commonalities 
mean that something that works well for law enforcement could be applied to intelligence 
and security analysis?  
B. PURPOSE AND OBJECTIVES 
The purpose of this thesis is to determine whether it is feasible to apply the 
method of geographic profiling, a method successfully used by law enforcement for 
hunting serial criminals, to terrorists and terrorist acts. In general, geographic profiling 
“is based on crime pattern, routine activity, and rational choice theories from 
environmental criminology, a field of study interested in the interactions between 
2 
criminals and the physical environment that surrounds them.”1 Due to the complexity of 
terrorist networks, the author will begin by studying the feasibility of applying 
geographic profiling toward anticipating the next actions of a terrorist organization and 
predicting when are where their next attack could occur. If successful, future efforts may 
move toward the illumination of terrorist networks and finally, the search for individuals 
within the organization. Also explored will be whether existing models of geographic 
profiling can be improved upon by including variables not just related to the location of 
the event, but to terrorists as well.  
C. METHODOLOGY 
This thesis will utilize data concerning terrorist attacks and input these data into 
established models of geographic profiling to see whether they can accurately predict 
where the next attack will occur. Today, there are four primary models of geographic 
profiling utilized by law enforcement officials: CrimeStat, Rigel Analyst, Dragnet, and 
Predator. For this thesis, the CrimeStat Version III program will be utilized, due to its 
accessibility and because additional variables can easily be included in the program. 
Along with using CrimeStat to conduct analysis of terrorist incidents, information about 
the Philippines, such as population data, terrain, roads, and built-up places will be 
incorporated to aid in determining whether the location where future incidents occurred 
made sense and could be predicted. This thesis will utilize data received from the 
Common Operation Research Environment (CORE) Lab concerning terrorist attacks that 
occurred in the Philippines and input their location data into the preexisting and 
combination models of geographic profiling. Not all of the data from each set will be 
entered because the later attacks will serve as the testing criteria for each of the models.  
It is the goal of this thesis to determine whether geographic profiling software and 
techniques can be utilized to predict future terrorist attacks. By leaving out some of the 
data from the data sets, it will be possible to compare the predictions made by the various 
 
                                                 
 1 D. Kim Rossmo, Ian Laverty and Brad Moore, “Geographic Profiling for Serial Crime 
Investigation,” in Geographic Information Systems and Crime Analysis, ed. Fahui Wang (Hershey, PA: 
Idea Group, 2005), 104. 
3 
models to the actual outcomes and determine the differences between the two in order to 
see which of the models made the closest prediction to the actual event (i.e., reflected in 
the smallest degree of difference). 
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II. THE APPLICABILITY OF GEOGRAPHIC PROFILING 
TO TERRORIST ACTION 
A. WHAT IS GEOGRAPHIC PROFILING? 
Craig Bennell and Shevaun Corey describe geographic profiling as “using 
knowledge about the relative locations of an offender’s crime sites to predict the highest 
probable location of his or her residence.”2 This field is relatively young, started in 1987 
by D. Kim Rossmo, and is currently utilized by law enforcement agencies to prioritize 
suspects in criminal investigations and determine the areas where to saturate police 
patrols. Geographic profiling operates under the premise that the locations of crimes are 
not completely random but, in fact, have a “degree of underlying spatial structure” to 
them because there is some rationality behind the selection of their locations.3 The 
primary goal of geographic profiling is the establishment of an anchor point, or the place 
where an offender primarily operates from, and likely the single most important place in 
his or her life. Anchor points can include the offender’s home, his or her workplace, a 
home of a friend of the offender, or even a bar or restaurant. Data can be collected from 
previous crimes and used to create a profile of the criminal’s geography. Rossmo’s model 
operates under the following beliefs: that an offender is more likely to choose locations 
that are closer to his or her anchor point rather than farther away, and though the offender 
targets areas closer to his or her anchor point, he or she will avoid targeting locations too 
close to this anchor point in order to avoid being caught.4 
From his or her focal point, an offender searches outward for the target; this 
search is typically modeled by some sort of distance-decay function. This distance-decay 
                                                 
 2 Craig Bennell and Shevaun Corey, “Geographic Profiling of Terrorist Attacks,” in Criminal 
Profiling: International Theory, Research, and Practice, ed. R.N. Kocsis (Totowa, NJ: Humana Press, 
2007), 190. 
 3 D. Kim Rossmo, “Place, Space, and Police Investigations: Hunting Serial Violent Criminals,” Crime 
Prevention Studies 4 (1995): 222. 
 4 University of Washington Department of Mathematics student team, Yet Another Mathematical 
Approach to Geographic Profiling: Control #7502 (Seattle: University of Washington, 2010), 6. 
6 
function illustrates an inverse relationship between the number of incidents and the 
distance from an offender’s anchor point.5  
In order to construct a geographic profile, the coordinates of crime scenes are 
entered into a software analysis program that contains an algorithm known as the CGT 
(criminal geographic targeting). The CGT algorithm is based on the three-dimensional 
aspect of the hunt process a criminal goes through when searching for a target. As 
described in Geographic Profiling for Serial Crime Investigation, the algorithm “divides 
the hunt area (the area enclosing all of the crime sites) into a fine grid, and then calculates 
the probability that each individual grid point is the offender’s anchor point.”6 It yields a 
probability graph, called a jeopardy surface, where the greater the height depicted, the 
greater the probability the given location is the offender’s anchor point; this can then be 
converted into a two-dimensional map and overlaid on a map of the area.7 Once 
generated, this geographic profile has a number of applications in the world of law 
enforcement.   
Since the advent of geographic profiling, this method has helped aid in several 
investigations for law enforcement agencies including the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (FBI), the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP), Scotland Yard, as well 
as agencies at the state and local levels.8 Even though a geographic profile does not mark 
the exact location of the person who most likely committed the series of crimes, it does 
help narrow the search area and also provides another possible metric to compare a list of 
suspects against. An example of the success Scotland Yard has had with utilizing a 
geographic profile was its 1994 to 1998 search for the Mardi Gras Bomber. The bomber 
was responsible for 36 bombings in the London area and when a geographic profile was 
requested, it produced two areas where it was highly probable that the bomber resided or 
operated from. When the people responsible were arrested, their residence was located in 
                                                 
5 Rossmo, “Place, Space, and Police Investigations,” 223. 
6 Rossmo, Laverty and Moore, “Geographic Profiling for Serial Crime Investigation,” 107. 
7 Ibid., 108. 
8 D. Kim Rossmo, Geographic Profiling (Boca Raton, FL: CRC Press, 2000), 212. 
7 
the top 3.4% of the suspect’s hunting area.9 Geographic profiling has also helped to 
illuminate search areas not previously considered, as was the case of the South Side 
Rapist in Lafayette, LA. Following 14 rapes that occurred over a period of 11 years, the 
generated geographic profile highlighted a new neighborhood that served as the 
foundation for a hotline receiving tips. One tip matched this profile as well as a 
psychological profile, and surveillance of the suspect led to obtaining his 
deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) and comparing this DNA to samples collected at the crime 
scenes resulted in a match and his arrest.10 
Geographic profiling also has applications outside the search for and 
apprehension of individual perpetrators; it can also be utilized more generally for the 
improvement of police patrols. In Memphis, TN, city officials have seen a decrease in 
crime with the help of operation Blue CRUSH (Crime Reduction Utilizing Statistical 
History). “Blue CRUSH is a data mining approach to the analysis of location- and time-
based criminal patterns and evolving trends.”11 With its help, Memphis has experienced a 
16% decline in crime between 2006 and 2008. This program is able to utilize existing as 
well as incoming data from police patrols on a variety of information such as the location 
of crimes, the type of crime, day and time of crimes, and victim characteristics, which 
help generate a tactical crime prediction.12 Blue CRUSH’s timely incorporation of data 
into a multilayered map allows police patrol and unmarked cars to be placed throughout 
the city in hopes of catching crimes during their commission and serving as a deterrent. 
The program has helped Memphis reduce both drug and gang related activity as well as 
crime in general in the city.13 
                                                 
9 Rossmo, Geographic Profiling, 215–216.  
 10 Rossmo, Geographic Profiling, 226. 
11 Walter C. Perry et al., “Using Predictions to Support Police Operations,” in Predictive Policing: The 
Role of Crime Forecasting in Law Enforcement Operations (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2012), 67. 
 12 Perry et al., “Using Predictions to Support Police Operations,” 68. 
 13 Ibid. 
8 
B. WHY SHOULD THE UNITED STATES EXPLORE EXPANDED 
UTILIZATION OF GEOGRAPHIC PROFILING? 
The prevailing methods of counterterrorism currently in use are alone not enough 
to handle the task of stopping terrorists and their attacks. Terrorists do not operate out in 
the open; they actively seek to maintain secrecy and the element of surprise because these 
allow them to instill fear in their enemies and increase their likelihood of survival.14 
While current methods of counterterrorism claim some success, these terrorist 
organizations still exist. These methods have included counter-messaging, trying to turn 
the support of the local population away from the terrorists, targeting senior leaders, and 
seeking to reduce their numbers.15 All of these methods have relied heavily on 
intelligence, but intelligence can be flawed, and in turn, negatively impact the choices 
made based on the collected information. 
Intelligence information comes in several forms and from several sources of 
collection. Due to the abundance of intelligence collected not only by intelligence 
services but from tips and unusual or suspicious activity reports, combined with a lack of 
proper resources to handle the volume of information, an overload can occur.16 Even 
though a large amount of intelligence is received, not every essential piece of intelligence 
needed to make a decision can be collected. The information, even if accurate, will not 
always be analyzed and disseminated in a timely manner. Sometimes, the assets needed 
to collect intelligence are not always available. When utilizing people to collect 
information, language and cultural barriers can exist that prevent these outsiders from 
being able to either infiltrate an organization or work with the local population. Even if 
able to obtain information from people on the inside in the form of defectors or 
informants, that intelligence could be unreliable and further set back counterterrorism 
efforts. The events of September 11 highlight another problem with intelligence: even if 
                                                 
14 David Charters, “Counterterrorism Intelligence: Sources, Methods, Process, and Problems,” in 
Democratic Responses to International Terrorism (New York: Transnational Pub, 1990), 228–229. 
15 Martha Crenshaw, “How Terrorism Declines,” Terrorism and Political Violence 3, no. 1 (1991), 
85.. 
16 D. Kim Rossmo and Keith Harries, “The Geospatial Structure of Terrorist Cells,” Justice Quarterly 
28, no. 2 (2011): 222. 
9 
the information is collected, if it is not shared among all intelligence agencies and 
relevant organizations, opportunities can be missed and countries can fall victim to a 
terrorist attack.17  Because of these issues, perhaps it is time to incorporate new methods 
into the fight, methods such as geographic profiling. The information overload problem 
will continue to exist for the foreseeable future, but geographic profiling would allow for 
this abundant information to be utilized in a different manner. Kim Rossmo and Keith 
Harries highlight that “because of the prevalence of spatial information, however, 
geographic prioritization models can be useful tools in the management of information 
overload situations.”18 In How Does Studying Terrorism Compare to Studying Crime, 
Gary LaFree and Laura Dugan highlight how researchers of terrorism could incorporate 
geographic profiling techniques. 
An important strategy used by criminologists to study spatial and temporal 
patterns of events employs geographic mapping techniques. Just as these 
scholars have imbedded crime incidents into maps of countries and cities, 
terrorism researchers can create regional and world-wide maps depicting 
numbers and rates of terrorist activities around the globe.19 
Geographic profiling offers a possible solution to the problems caused by a reliance on 
intelligence. The models of geographic profiling currently in use utilize for their inputs 
hard data points such as location and distance from a particular point. Geographic 
profiling also removes the uncertainty about the correctness of the information because 
the data is based on the location of attacks that have already occurred and that 
information is able to be verified. It also is able to move past cultural and language 
concerns because it does not rely on human agents to obtain the needed information. 
Finally, because the location of attacks is common knowledge, the various agencies 
would not have to struggle to gather information from each other, which help to reduce 
the reliance counterterrorism agencies have on one another.    
                                                 
17 Charters, “Counterterrorism Intelligence,” 252–257.  
18 Rossmo and Harries, “The Geospatial Structure of Terrorist Cells,” 222. 
19 Gary LaFree and Laura Dugan, “How Does Studying Terrorism Compare to Studying Crime?” 
Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism: Criminological Perspectives 5 (2004): 68. 
10 
Apart from the possibility that geographic profiling could be utilized in aiding the 
prediction of where and when a terrorist organization will attack next, geographic 
profiling could potentially offer other applications to the military such as for 
incorporation into their cordon and search operations, which would aid in 
counterinsurgency operations. 
C. SIMILARITIES BETWEEN SERIAL CRIMINALS AND TERRORISTS 
In order to export the theory of geographic profiling to counterterrorism, a 
number of assumptions about terrorists and serial criminals need to be examined. At first 
glance, there may not appear to be many similarities between the two groups, but upon 
closer examination, the two share several commonalities. In order for a crime to occur, 
three requirements must be met: a motivated offender, a suitable target, and the lack of an 
authority’s presence,20 something both serial crimes and terrorist attacks share. Both 
types of offenders, serial criminals and terrorists, commit multiple offenses; the two can 
both have a signature, which makes it possible to determine whether or not it is the same 
individual or group committing a crime or attack. Deborah Schurman-Kauflin argues that 
another similarity shared by serial criminals, serial killers in particular, and terrorists lies 
in the fact that both types have a fantasy of some sort and want to see that fantasy come 
to life; they will then seek activities that reinforce that what they want to do is correct.21  
Another similarity exists between the two types during the preparation phase 
because, as a criminal or terrorist prepares for an attack, they generally have a specific 
sequence of events that they follow. Michael Freeman, David Tucker, and Steffen Merten 
have divided the actions a terrorist or terrorist organization conducts prior to the attack 
into nine distinct phases: “networking, training, general planning, attack-specific 
recruitment, financing, operational planning, weapons procurement, logistical 
preparation, and operational preparation.”22 Further modeling into these nine distinct 
                                                 
20 Rossmo, Laverty and Moore, “Geographic Profiling for Serial Crime Investigation,” 105. 
21 Deborah Schurman-Kauflin, Disturbed: Terrorist Behavioral Profiles (Sun City, AZ: Violent 
Crimes Institute, LLC, 2008), 89. 
22 Michael Freeman, David Tucker, and Steffen Merten, “Pathways to Terror: Finding Patterns Prior 
to an Attack,” Journal of Policing, Intelligence and Counter Terrorism 5, no. 1 (2010): 76. 
11 
phases by Thompson and Fox has given priority values to these phases using multi-
attribute decision making (MADM) analysis. Using Analytical Hierarchy Process as the 
vehicle for MADM their results showed that terrorist training, networking, planning, and 





Terrorist Training 27.40% 1 
Networking 16.40% 2 
Planning 11.40% 3 
Operational 
Preparation 10.00% 4 
Financing 8.56% 5 
Recruitment 8.00% 6 
Operational Planning 7.20% 7 
Weapons Procurement 6.10% 8 
Logistical Preparation 4.86% 9 
Table 1.   The Table Shows the Final Outcome from the AHP Analysis by Fox 
and Thompson.23  
Furthermore, they applied the technique of order preference by similarity to ideal 
solution (TOPSIS) and obtained the priorities shown in Table 2, where operational 





                                                 
23 William P. Fox and Nicholas Thompson, “Phase Targeting of Terrorist Attacks: Simplifying 
Complexity with AHP and TOPSIS,” Journal of Defense Management 4, no. 116 (2014). 
24 Fox, “Phase Targeting of Terrorist Attacks.” 
12 





Preparation 1 26.1996 26.1996 
0.774866 Recruiting 2 24.85038 51.04998 
0.49741 Terrorist Training 3 15.95221 67.00219 
0.294915 Networking 4 9.458104 76.46029 
0.268568 Weapons Procurement 5 8.613136 85.07343 
0.174234 Planning 6 5.58778 90.66121 
0.126706 Financing 7 4.063533 94.72474 
0.086217 Operational Planning 8 2.765018 97.48976 
0.078273 Logistical Preparation 9 2.510244 100 
3.118124 Total       
Table 2.   This Table Shows the Cumulative Percentages Generated through 
TOPSIS Analysis by Fox and Thompson.25  
The two methods share terrorist training, networking, and operational preparation 
among their top three variables. These give us insights into the process. This information 
can be incorporated by security forces and intelligence analysts, who previously have 
been likely to determine what sort of attack a particular organization may be working 
toward, and be able to focus their efforts on looking for a particular set of events to occur 
in order to more accurately determine the timing of an attack and perhaps be able to 
prevent it from happening.   
Finally, when narrowing serial criminals down to serial killers, the further 
comparison of target type can be included to illustrate their similarities because both 
groups tend to choose soft targets.  While several terrorist organizations aim to eventually 
conduct a large-scale attack against an important landmark or other piece of infrastructure 
that would likely produce a devastating effect on an entire country, their day-to-day 
attacks focus more on smaller-scale efforts that target people. Much like the more 
commonplace attacks made by terrorists the “soft” people over the “hard” pieces of 
infrastructure; serial criminals tend to target those in society who are more vulnerable to 
attack. 
                                                 
25 Ibid. 
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D. PREVIOUS ATTEMPTS TO APPLY GEOGRAPHIC PROFILING TO 
TERRORISM 
Previous attempts to apply geographic profiling to terrorism are few in number, 
and these few attempts have yielded mixed results. Craig Bennell and Shevaun Corey 
examined two terrorist groups, Action Directe, which primarily operated in France and 
The Revolutionary People’s Struggle in Greece. They chose to focus on one specific 
individual in each group and a series of attacks that they were tied to. The two 
researchers ran their collected information through geographic profiling software and in 
the case of Action Directe, were not able to accurately identify the individual’s anchor 
point due to the offender traveling great distances to attack his targets. However, in the 
case of The Revolutionary People’s Struggle, the geographic profile was able to identify 
the location of the individual’s anchor point with a 14% hit percentage because the 
offender did not travel great distances.26 Their research posited that geographic profiling 
has five assumptions that have to be met in order to ensure accuracy: “the profile must be 
based on multiple crime sites, the crimes must be linked to the same offender, the 
offender committing the crimes cannot be commuting into the area of criminal activity, 
the distribution of suitable targets must be relatively uniform around the offender’s home, 
and the offender cannot move anchor points during his or her crime series.”27 However, 
terrorist attacks and their perpetrators do not always meet these five assumptions. They 
explain that two assumptions of the five assumptions will frequently be met and the 
remaining three will only sometimes be met. In the cases studied by Bennell and Covey 
the assumptions that will frequently be met in the terrorist context are the first two; they 
require multiple crimes and locations as well as all the offenses need to be tied to the 
same individual. The other three assumptions will only sometimes be met, but it is 
believed that under certain conditions, these assumptions could be met.28 They conclude 
their research stating that “geographic profiling may be possible in the terrorist context, 
                                                 
 26 Bennell and Corey, “Geographic Profiling of Terrorist Attacks,” 195–199. 
27 Ibid, 192–193. 
28 Ibid., 192–195. 
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but only under certain conditions.”29 However, they claim that they may have 
underestimated the value of geographic profiling and that it needs to be further explored.  
Another effort that sought to apply geospatial information concerning terrorist 
cells and their eventual attacks in order to determine whether any spatial patterns exist in 
their behavior was headed by D. Kim Rossmo and Keith Harries. They studied the 
behavior of terrorist cells operating in Ankara and Istanbul, Turkey.30 The primary goal 
of their research “was to develop the basis for a geographic prioritization model that 
could be used to help locate various elements of terrorist cells, similar to the one used in 
the geographic profiling of serial crime.”31 In their course of their research, they 
discovered that local and proximate spatial relationships exist between terrorist incidents 
and the location of their cells.32 Their model was also able to demonstrate the feasibility 
of making a geospatial approach to studying terrorist actions. They also concluded that 
like criminals, in terms of geography, terrorists behave rationally. Furthermore, they state 
that their model could be improved upon by the inclusion of three factors: “base rate or 
prior probability of an active terrorist cell in a given area;” “incorporating a demographic 
analysis;” and incorporating more than one cell site.33 Together, these previous efforts to 
apply geographic profiling or geospatial analysis to some aspect of terrorism indicate that 
this new approach is possible, but will require further research and work; something this 
thesis seeks to accomplish.  
 
                                                 
 29 Ibid., 199. 
30 Rossmo and Harries, “The Geospatial Structure of Terrorist Cells,” 222. 
31 Ibid., 243. 
32 Ibid., 242. 
33 Ibid., 243–244. 
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III. GEOGRAPHIC PROFILING SOFTWARE AND CASE STUDY 
A. GEOGRAPHIC INFORMATION SYSTEMS 
According to Susan Smith and Christopher Bruce, geographic information 
systems (GIS) are “hardware and software that collects, stores, retrieves, manipulates, 
queries, analyzes, and displays spatial data. GIS is a computerized fusion of maps with 
underlying databases that provide information about map objects.”34 GIS generates a map 
and this map can be analyzed visually; however, this visual interpretation can only get 
someone so far and further, more complete analysis is needed, especially when large 
amounts of data points are being analyzed. In order to complete these more complex 
calculations, spatial statistics, or “mathematical technique that apply descriptive and 
multivariate statistics, mathematical modeling, and algorithms to spatial data,” are needed 
and that is where CrimeStat can be utilized.35  
B. CRIMESTAT 
CrimeStat was first released in August 1999, but the edition that was utilized in 
this thesis is version 3.3 (CrimeStat III). CrimeStat IV (version 4.0) was released this past 
November but not evaluated in this thesis, as instructional material for this new version 
was not available until spring 2014. “CrimeStat is a Windows-based spatial statistics 
application developed by Ned Levine and Associates of Houston, Texas, under a grant 
from the NIJ” (National Institute of Justice).36 CrimeStat is not a GIS, but it can read files 
from those programs and also produce results that can be read by a GIS. It takes the 
locations where crimes occurred and is able to perform a wide array of calculations on 
these coordinates.37 All of these can be exported as various map layers that can be 
displayed in a GIS. 
                                                 
34 S. Smith and C. Bruce, CrimeStat III User Workbook (Washington, DC: National Institute of 
Justice, 2008), 2. 
 35 Ibid., 3.  
 36 Ibid., 4. 
37 Ibid.  
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CrimeStat is designed to help users: identify patterns in crime; identify a “target 
area” in which a serial offender is most like to strike next; identify and prioritize hot 
spots; conduct a risk analysis throughout the area of operations based on where previous 
incidents have occurred; and to produce a geographic profile.38 Most of these specified 
goals coincide with the goals of this thesis, making CrimeStat an attractive analysis tool 
for use.  
CrimeStat is self-described as being easy to use and its instruction manual covers 
its operation in just four steps: enter the data in the “data setup” screen; choose what 
analysis wanted along with the parameters; run the computation; close output window. 
An additional step is required if the resultant output is a map layer and therefore must be 
opened in a GIS program.39 In order to run, one primary file consisting of X and Y 
coordinates is required; but another attractive element of CrimeStat is that it allows for a 
secondary file to be included that the primary file can be compared to in the running of 
certain spatial statistics. An example of this is placing the location of homicides in the 
primary file and poverty rates for the same area in the secondary file. Of course 
CrimeStat is not the only type of software available with application for geographic 
profiling. As previously mentioned, three other major programs exists: Rigel, Dragnet, 
and Predator, but “CrimeStat’s virtue is collecting different methods of spatial statistical 
analysis into a single application that works with multiple geographic information 
systems,” and is fairly simple to use even though the analysis it performs can be rather 
complex.40 
C. THE DATA 
In this thesis, the incidents of terrorism that will be analyzed came from a 
Stanford University dissertation by Joseph H. Felter, titled “Taking Guns to a Knife 
Fight: A Case for Empirical Study of Counterinsurgency” by way of the Naval 
Postgraduate School’s Common Operational Research Environment (CORE) Lab. The 
                                                 
 38 Smith and Bruce, CrimeStat III User Workbook, 5. 
 39 Ibid., 8. 
40 Ibid., 7. 
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data covered the time period of 2001 to 2008 in the Philippine major island of Mindanao 
and its surrounding smaller islands. Mindanao is the southernmost island in the 
Philippines and is the second largest in size. Since the Philippines achieved independence 
in 1946, this island in particular has experienced a large amount of terrorist activity from 
a number of different organizations focused on achieving either independence or 
autonomy from the government. The data provided includes the date of the incident, 
where it occurred, who it involved, what sort of incident it was, the number of casualties, 
and other categories of information.41 The total number of incidents over this eight-year 
period was 10,990, but that number includes incidents initiated by counterinsurgency and 
local police forces. The removal of these incidents reduces the number of incidents to 
4,601 enemy-initiated events. As there are several different terrorist groups and other 
organizations responsible for all of these incidents, the data will be further broken down 
into the four primary organizations: Communist Terrorist Movements (CTM), Lawless 
Elements (LE), Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), and the Abu Sayyaf Group 
(ASG). The terrorist organization that this thesis will focus on is the Abu Sayyaf Group, 
as their incidents are more concentrated, rather than being dispersed throughout 
Mindanao, like the other organizations.  
Another program utilized in this thesis was ArcMap 10.1, a component of the 
ArcGIS program, developed by Esri. Both CrimeStat and ArcMap were used to develop 
an image highlighting the locations of terrorist incidents by the ASG, perform a number 
of calculations, and visualize the calculations as layers of data points in ArcMap.  
In CrimeStat, the data set was uploaded as an ArcGIS shapefile; the geographic 
area of reference the data falls in was set; the measurement parameters selected; and the 
type of calculation wanted chosen. The types of calculations utilized in CrimeStat 
included: spatial description, such as, mean center and standard distance, standard 
deviation ellipse, median center, center of minimum distance, nearest neighbor analysis, 
and hot spot analysis; and spatial modeling, to include kernel density estimate.    
                                                 
41 Joseph Felter, “Taking Guns to a Knife Fight: A Case for Empirical Study of Counterinsurgency” 
(PhD diss., Stanford University, 2009). 
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D. THE ABU SAYYAF GROUP 
The Abu Sayyaf group is commonly believed to have formed sometime during the 
late 1980s or early 1990s following repeated perceived failures by the Moro National 
Liberation Front (MNLF), the first group that emerged against the Philippine state in 
order to achieve secession from the country and establish an Islamic state. The efforts of 
the MNLF and later the MILF, the first organization to break away from the MNLF and 
form, had resulted in the establishment of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao 
(ARMM). The ARMM was originally intended to be created in 1976 as a result of the 
Tripoli Agreement between the government and the MNLF, but a breakdown in how to 
implement the agreement prevented the formation of the ARMM until 1989.42 Currently, 
five provinces compose the ARMM: Basilan, except for Isabela City; Sulu; Lanao del 
Sur; Maguindanao; and Tawi-Tawi. The establishment of the ARMM “provided a limited 
measure of self-rule. But the autonomous government lacked the resources to tackle the 
problems of the poorest region of the Philippines, and the devastation caused by years of 
war.”43 Throughout its existence, the ASG has operated primarily throughout the 
ARMM, but the majority of its attacks have occurred in the provinces of Basilan and 
Sulu, both areas that have served as a base of operations for the ASG. 
ASG is a small organization; today it is believed to not have any more than 500 
members, though no one is certain about just how many people have joined. Compared to 
the MNLF and the MILF, it is certainly the most violent; of the three, it is the only group 
that has been designated by the United States and has been included on the US State 
Department’s list of Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTO). Like the other two separatist 
groups, the ASG is committed to the creation of an independent Muslim state; however, 
the ASG is anti-Christian, and many of its attacks target this population. The founder of 
the ASG, Ustadz Abdurajak Janjalani, believed that the only way to achieve this just 
Islamic state is through the use of jihad and encouraged Muslims to go all the way to the 
                                                 
42 Sylvia Concepcion et al., “Breaking the Links between Economics and Conflict in Mindanao,” 
presented at the Waging Peace conference in Manila, December 2003, 9, http://ki-
volunteer.org/index.php?option=com_docman&task=doc_download&gid=2&Itemid=79. 
43 Ibid., 11. 
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highest level, martyrdom, to help achieve it.
44
 Since its creation, the ASG has changed its 
method of attack, switching back and forth between bombings and kidnap for ransoms 
(KFR), depending on the current situation.  
From 2001 to 2008, of the 4,601 enemy-initiated incidents in Mindanao, 299 were 
perpetrated by the Abu Sayyaf group. For the 299 incidents analyzed the breakdown of 




Percentage of Total 
Incidents 
Abduction 27 9.030 
Ambush 44 14.716 
Armed Clash 2 0.669 
Arson 3 1.003 
Bombing 13 4.348 
Disarming 1 0.334 
Encounter 32 10.702 
Harassment  47 15.719 
Hold-Up 1 0.334 
Hostage Taking 2 0.669 
Jail Break 2 0.669 
Kidnapping 11 3.679 
Killing 3 1.003 
Land Mining 8 2.676 
Liquidation 13 4.348 
Mutilation 1 0.334 
Raid 10 3.344 
Sabotage 1 0.334 
Sea Jacking 1 0.334 
Shooting 26 8.696 
Stabbing 2 0.669 
Strafing 3 1.003 
Surrender 
(Capture) 46 15.385 
Total 299 100 
Table 3.   ASG-Initiated incidents in Mindanao: 2001–2008 
                                                 
44 Rommel C. Banlaoi, “The Abu Sayyaf Group: From Mere Banditry to Genuine Terrorism,” 
Southeast Asian Affairs 2006, 251.  
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With so many different types of incidents being utilized by the ASG, it raises 
whether this organization attacked with what was convenient. With this in mind, the 
different incidents have also been analyzed in groups similar in type. These groupings 














Encounter/Harassment 79 26.42140468 
Hold-Up/Sabotage 2 0.668896321 
Disarming/Surrender (Capture) 47 15.71906355 
Jail Break 2 0.668896321 
Land Mining 8 2.675585284 
Raid 10 3.344481605 
Table 4.   ASG-Initiated incidents in Mindanao: 2001–2008 (Grouped) 
However, not all 299 incidents were analyzed in this thesis; the 41 incidents that 
occurred on the island of Mindanao lie outside the geographical scope of this study. This 
thesis focuses on the 258 incidents that occurred on the islands of Basilan (78) and Sulu 
(180). These incidents will be analyzed both on a year-to-year basis as well as part of a 
larger group (2001–2007) in terms of both incident number and type; these results will 
then be compared to the actual data from 2008 in order to determine whether or not 
different methods of analysis aid in predicting where incidents will occur and what type 
of incidents will occur. The various strategies for analyzing the ASG-initiated incident 
data will focus on hot spot analysis, percent differences based on average outcomes 
compared to the actual outcomes, and normalization by both total number of incidents 
and population of each municipality.  
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IV. ANALYZING THE ABU SAYYAF GROUP’S ACTIVITIES 
A. RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
In order to determine whether geographic profiling techniques were able to effectively 
indicate the location of future attacks, the incidents that occurred in 2008 were removed 
from calculations performed both by CrimeStat and ArcGIS software programs. The data 
the analysis was performed on covered the years 2001 to 2007; the results of this analysis 
were compared to incidents that occurred in 2008 in the same geographic areas (Basilan 
and Sulu). Apart from comparing the 2008 events to those that happened from 2001–
2007, other comparisons will be made: year to year in both number of total incidents and 
type of incident; and municipality comparisons in both number and type of incidents. In 
order to measure the success of particular geographic profiling techniques, primarily this 
thesis will focus on the associated percentages generated from each portion of analysis. 
These percentages will either be based on either the accuracy of a particular method in 
forecasting where an incident will occur (what type of incident it will be) or the percent 
difference between the calculated average from the 2001–2007 period and the actual 
outcome from 2008. 
The largest portion of this analysis was conducted utilizing different types of hot 
spot analysis, a tool used in identifying where crime incidents cluster. Hot spots are 
defined as “concentrations of incidents within a limited geographic area that appear over 
time.”45 Several different types of hot spot analysis methods exist, but for the purpose of 
this thesis point location analysis was utilized due to the sheer size of the area being 
studied. This type of clustering technique involves counting how many incidents occurred 
at each location; the locations with the highest number of incidents are identified as hot 
spots.46    
                                                 
45 Ned Levine & Associates, CrimeStat IV: A Spatial Statistics Program for the Analysis of Crime 
Incident Locations Manual (Washington, DC: National Institute of Justice, 2013), 7.1. 
46 Ibid., 7.2. 
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In CrimeStat, this type of hot spot analysis is called the Mode routine. With this 
analysis, the locations that saw the highest number of incidents will be indicated; the top 
locations from the years 2001–2007 will be compared to the incidents that occurred in 
2008 to determine whether or not the incidents follow a pattern by continuing to occur in 
locations that were previously the site of an incident. Running this analysis means that 
the incidents will be counted, the frequency of the events calculated, and the resulting 
ranking of most to least frequent locations are generated in the output. Along with a 
ranking of locations, CrimeStat also creates a ‘dbf’ file that can be imported into ArcGIS 
and depicted for visual interpretation.  
B. MICROSOFT EXCEL—ANALYZING HISTORICAL DATA FOR 
INCIDENT NUMBER AND TYPE 
For the eight years of incident data, the information was broken out into the number of 
incidents that occurred in total for both Sulu and Basilan and then further broken down 
by how many incidents occurred in each municipality each year from 2001 to 2008. The 






Number of Incidents in Sulu Municipalities / Percentage of Year's Total Incidents 
Year 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Total Incidents 
Occurred 
44 10 19 10 27 31 17 22 
Municipality 
 
Indanan 3 6.82 4 40.00 2 10.53 0 0.00 11 40.74 6 19.35 4 23.53 1 4.55 
Jolo 5 11.36 0 0.00 3 15.79 1 10.00 0 0.00 14 45.16 0 0.00 0 0.00 
Kalingalan 
Caluang 
2 4.55 1 10.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 1 5.88 0 0.00 
Luuk 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 1 4.55 
Maimbung 5 11.36 0 0.00 2 10.53 4 40.00 4 14.81 4 12.90 1 5.88 4 18.18 
Old Panamao 2 4.55 0 0.00 2 10.53 0 0.00 3 11.11 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 
Panglima 
Estino 
1 2.27 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 1 5.88 1 4.55 
Parang 0 0.00 1 10.00 0 0.00 1 10.00 4 14.81 0 0.00 4 23.53 1 4.55 
Patikul 7 15.91 4 40.00 7 36.84 4 40.00 3 11.11 5 16.13 2 11.76 13 59.09 
Talipao 19 43.18 0 0.00 3 15.79 0 0.00 2 7.41 2 6.45 4 23.53 1 4.55 
Table 5.   Sulu Incidents Broken Down by Year and Municipality 
. 
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As indicated (bolded) in Table 5, there are three municipalities that either saw at 
least one incident either every year (Patikul), or in seven out of the eight years (88%) 
(Indanan and Maimbung). One other municipality, Talipao, sees an incident in six out of 
the eight years (75%). Together, these four municipalities outweighed the other six 
municipalities in Sulu; all of the municipalities that experienced attacks in five of the 
seven preceding years to 2008, would go on to experience an incident in 2008. Out of the 
eight years covered, only in 2006, did a municipality not in the previously mentioned 
four, Jolo, the island’s capital, have the highest number/percentage of incidents. Half of 
the time, Patikul was either the municipality that saw the most activity or was tied for the 
most activity, one of those years being 2008. In attempting to make a prediction about 
which municipality would be likely to see an incident occur in 2008, the following 
observation can be made: if a municipality experiences an incident in four out of the 
seven years preceding 2008, the municipality has an 83% (5/6) chance of having an 
incident occur during 2008. It also can be observed that if a municipality experiences an 
incident in three or less of the years preceding 2008, that municipality has a 50% (2/4) 
chance of experiencing an incident; though it also appears that if a majority of events take 
place in the earlier years (2001–2004), the municipality is less likely to be the location of  





  Number of Incidents in Basilan Municipalities / Percentage of Year's Total Incidents 
Year 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Total Incidents 
Occurred 
27 9 8 6 4 0 9 15 
Municipality   
Isabela 2 7.41 3 33.33 2 25.00 2 33.33 0 0.00 0 0.00 1 11.11 0 0.00 
Lamitan 10 37.04 0 0.00 0 0.00 1 16.67 0 0.00 0 0.00 1 11.11 1 6.67 
Lantawan 4 14.81 2 22.22 3 37.50 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 1 11.11 0 0.00 
Maluso 1 3.70 0 0.00 0 0.00 1 16.67 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 
Sumisip 5 18.52 4 44.44 1 12.50 2 33.33 3 75.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 1 6.67 
Tipo-Tipo 2 7.41 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 6 66.67 4 26.67 
Tuburan 3 11.11 0 0.00 2 25.00 0 0.00 1 25.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 9 60.00 
Table 6.   Basilan Incidents Broken Down by Year and Municipality
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As highlighted in Table 6, unlike the municipalities of Sulu, those of Basilan were 
not the sites of an incident every year or almost every year; instead, only two 
municipalities (bolded), Sumisip and Isabela (the capital), experienced an incident six 
(75%) or five (63%) years out of the eight, though it should be noted that although 
Isabela experienced an incident in five of the years leading up to 2008, it did not 
experience an incident in 2008. Unlike Sulu, where a municipality experiencing incidents 
in four or more of the seven years leading up to 2008 greatly increased a region’s chance 
of having an incident in 2008, Basilan’s municipalities tend to experience a 2008 incident 
if they experienced incidents in fewer years. For those municipalities that experienced 
incidents in three or less years preceding 2008, there is a 75% (3/4) chance of an incident 
occurring in 2008; whereas for the municipalities experiencing incidents in four or more 
of the seven previous years, there is only a 33% (1/3) chance of the municipality serving 
as the location of a 2008 incident. For these municipalities (Isabela and Lantawan), four 
out of three or three out of their four years in which an incident occurred fell during the 
2001–2004 time period. Of note, during the year 2006, Basilan experienced zero ASG-
initiated incidents. 
To illustrate how Sulu and Basilan compared to one another overall, the total 
number of incidents of each were compared. As the total number of incidents that 
occurred in Sulu over the eight years outnumbered the incidents that occurred in Basilan, 
the percentage difference between the two islands was also calculated. The results are 





Year 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Total Incidents in 
Sulu 
44 10 19 10 27 31 17 22 
Total Incidents in 
Basilan 
27 9 8 6 4 0 9 15 
Total Incidents  71 19 27 16 31 31 26 37 
Percentage of 
Events in Sulu 
61.97 52.63 70.37 62.50 87.10 100.00 65.38 59.46 
Percentage of 
Events in Basilan 





23.94 5.26 40.74 25.00 74.19 100.00 30.77 18.92 
Table 7.   Sulu Incident Totals versus Basilan Incident Totals 
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When the total number of incidents occurring on each island is compared, as expected the 
total number of incidents on Basilan was less than half of the total incidents that occurred 
on Sulu. In all seven years leading up to 2008 Sulu experiences more incidents than 
Basilan, meaning the higher occurrence of incidents in 2008 in Sulu once again make 
sense. Overall, while Sulu incidents might outnumber the Basilan incidents two-to-one, 
this ratio is not maintained throughout the years. Out of the eight years, only in two 
(25%) of them does Sulu have more than twice the number of incidents as Sulu; however, 
in these two years, the difference is quite large (74.19% and 100%). 
To further identify any patterns that emerged, the incidents were broken down 
once again by year, but this time, further subdivided by the total number of each type of 
incidents that occurred each year on the island. The result of this division is found in 





Number and Incident Type on Each Island 
Year 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Island Sulu Basilan Sulu Basilan Sulu Basilan Sulu Basilan Sulu Basilan Sulu Basilan Sulu Basilan Sulu Basilan 
Incident 
Type                 
Abduction 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 2 0 10 10 
Ambush 4 1 3 1 1 1 2 1 9 2 7 0 6 1 1 1 
Armed 
Clash 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Arson 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 
Bombing 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 5 0 0 0 0 1 
Disarming 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Encounter 5 7 4 3 9 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Harassment 1 4 1 0 1 0 2 0 9 0 4 0 3 6 7 1 
Hold-Up 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Hostage 
Taking 
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Jailbreak 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
Kidnapping 2 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Killing 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Land 
Mining 
0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 2 0 5 0 0 0 0 0 
Liquidation 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 7 0 0 0 1 0 
Mutilation 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
Raid 6 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Sabotage 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Sea 
Jacking 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Shooting 4 1 0 0 5 2 0 2 1 0 0 0 3 1 2 1 
Stabbing 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 
Strafing 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 
Surrender 
(Capture) 
21 9 1 4 2 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Table 8.   Incidents by Type per Year 
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Several observations can be made from viewing Table 8. First, the only type of 
incident that occurs every year in both municipalities, with the exception of Basilan on 
2006 where zero incidents occurred), was ambush. Sulu also experienced harassment 
every year from 2001 to 2008, though in Basilan, this type of incident occurred in only 
three of the eight years. During the 2001–2008, in four out of the eight years (50%), Sulu 
and Basilan share the most common type of incident. In 2001 surrender was most 
common (21 and nine); in 2003 encounter is the incident that occurred the most (nine and 
two); in 2002, it was encounter (four) for Sulu and surrender (four) for Basilan; in 2005, 
the most common incident was ambush (nine and two), though Sulu also experienced 
nine incidents of harassment; and in 2008, both Sulu and Basilan experienced ten 
abductions. In 2006, since Basilan experienced zero incidents that year, the highest 
numbers of incidents in Sulu were ambush and liquidation (seven). As for the other three 
years, while the type of incident occurred most frequently differed, the highest number of 
incidents was the same for both Sulu and Basilan. In 2002, Sulu experienced four 
encounters and Basilan four surrenders; in 2004, Sulu experienced two ambushes, 
harassments, and surrenders while Basilan experienced two shootings; lastly, in 2007, 
Sulu saw six ambushes and Basilan six incidents of harassment. 
Beyond looking at which events occur most frequently and how many of each 
type of incident occurs, further observations can be made about when the different 
incident types occur. For both encounters and surrenders these types of incidents stop 
happening after 2004; these could go hand in hand with one another as surrender is 
interpreted as an ASG-initiated encounter that results in the ASG surrendering. Like 
encounters and surrenders, kidnapping stops occurring after 2004, but a similar incident 
type, abduction, takes its place from 2004 and onward to 2008, meaning that between the 
two, an incident occurs every year on Sulu and occasionally on Basilan. Lastly, there is 
one event that occurs in five out of eight years (63%) in both Sulu and Basilan, though in 
different years: shooting; however, the instances of shooting are sporadic throughout the 
eight years (2001, 2003, 2005, 2007–2008 for Sulu and 2001, 2003–2004, 2007–2008 for 
Basilan). 
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Finally, the types of incidents that occurred in 2008 were: abduction, ambush, 
arson, bombing (though not on Sulu), harassment, liquidation (though not on Basilan), 
and shooting. For Sulu, if the island experienced a particular kind of incident in three or 
more out of the seven years prior to 2008, there is a 63% (5/8) chance that the island 
would also experience the same type of incident in 2008. For the three types of incidents 
that occurred in three or more years but did not occur in 2008 (encounter, kidnap, and 
surrender/capture), all occasions of these incidents occurred during the 2001–2004 time 
frame. Out of the six types of incidents that occurred on Sulu during 2008, 83% (5/6) 
occurred in three or more previous years. As for Basilan, if a type of incident was 
experienced in three or more years prior to 2008; the chances are similar to those on Sulu 
at 66% (2/3). Like Sulu, the one incident type that occurred in more than three years yet 
did not occur in 2008(encounter), never happened after 2003. The same is true if you 
lower the number of year’s threshold to two, though the likelihood of a similar type of 
incident occurring reduces to 50% (3/6). Out of the six types of incidents that occurred on 
Basilan in 2008, only 33% (2/6) occurred in three or more years; the same can be said for 
the incident types happening in only one out of seven years. 
To further illustrate the breakdown into individual incident type, the 
corresponding percentages of each type of event occurring on Sulu and Basilan by year 





Percentage of Incident Type on Each Island 
Year 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 



















Abduction 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 16.67 3.70 0.00 3.23 0.00 11.76 0.00 45.45 66.67 
Ambush 9.09 3.70 30.00 11.11 5.26 12.50 20.00 16.67 33.33 50.00 22.58 0.00 35.29 11.11 4.55 6.67 
Armed 
Clash 
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 7.41 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Arson 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 3.70 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 4.55 6.67 
Bombing 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 12.50 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 16.13 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 6.67 
Disarming 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 3.70 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Encounter 11.36 25.93 40.00 33.33 47.37 25.00 10.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Harassment 2.27 14.81 10.00 0.00 5.26 0.00 20.00 0.00 33.33 0.00 12.90 0.00 17.65 66.67 31.82 6.67 
Hold-Up 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 25.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Hostage 
Taking 
0.00 3.70 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Jailbreak 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 16.67 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 11.11 0.00 0.00 
Kidnapping 4.55 0.00 10.00 11.11 5.26 12.50 10.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Killing 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 10.00 0.00 0.00 25.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Land 
Mining 
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 12.50 0.00 0.00 7.41 0.00 16.13 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Liquidation 2.27 3.70 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 10.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 22.58 0.00 0.00 0.00 4.55 0.00 
Mutilation 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 5.88 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Raid 13.64 11.11 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Sabotage 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 3.70 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Sea 
Jacking 
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 16.67 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Shooting 9.09 3.70 0.00 0.00 26.32 25.00 0.00 33.33 3.70 0.00 0.00 0.00 17.65 11.11 9.09 6.67 
Stabbing 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 11.76 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Strafing 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 6.45 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Surrender 
(Capture) 
47.73 33.33 10.00 44.44 10.53 0.00 20.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Table 9.   Percentages of Incidents by Type per Year 
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As previously mentioned, since there was such diversity in incident type, perhaps 
the ASG simply utilized the most convenient method available at the time. With this in 
mind, the different incident types that were similar in nature were combined and analyzed 
in the same manner as each type separately. The number of each grouping of incidents  




  Number of Incident Type on Each Island 
Year 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Island Sulu Basilan Sulu Basilan Sulu Basilan Sulu Basilan Sulu Basilan Sulu Basilan Sulu Basilan Sulu Basilan 
Incident Type                                 
Abduction/Hostage Taking/   
Kidnapping/Sea Jacking 
2 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 0 1 0 2 0 10 10 
Ambush/Armed Clash/   
Arson/Bombing/Killing/      
Liquidation/ Mutilation/        
Shooting/Stabbing/Strafing 
9 3 3 1 6 4 4 3 13 3 21 0 12 2 5 4 
Encounter/Harassment 6 11 5 3 10 2 3 0 9 0 4 0 3 6 7 1 
Hold-Up/Sabotage 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Disarming/Surrender 
(Capture) 
21 9 1 4 2 0 2 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Jailbreak 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
Land Mining 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 2 0 5 0 0 0 0 0 
Raid 6 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Table 10.   Incidents by Type per Year (Groupings) 
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  Percentage of Incident Type on Each Island 
Year 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Island Sulu Basilan Sulu Basilan Sulu Basilan Sulu Basilan Sulu Basilan Sulu Basilan Sulu Basilan Sulu Basilan 
Incident Type                                 
Abduction/Hostage 
Taking/         
Kidnapping/Sea Jacking 
4.55 3.70 10.00 11.11 5.26 12.50 10.00 33.33 3.70 0.00 3.23 0.00 11.76 0.00 45.45 66.67 
Ambush/Armed Clash/          
Arson/Bombing/            
Killing/Liquidation/         
Mutilation/Shooting/           
Stabbing/Strafing 
20.45 11.11 30.00 11.11 31.58 50.00 40.00 50.00 48.15 75.00 67.74 0.00 70.59 22.22 22.73 26.67 
Encounter/Harassment 13.64 40.74 50.00 33.33 52.63 25.00 30.00 0.00 33.33 0.00 12.90 0.00 17.65 66.67 31.82 6.67 
Hold-Up/Sabotage 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 3.70 25.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Disarming/Surrender 
(Capture) 
47.73 33.33 10.00 44.44 10.53 0.00 20.00 0.00 3.70 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Jailbreak 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 16.67 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 11.11 0.00 0.00 
Land Mining 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 12.50 0.00 0.00 7.41 0.00 16.13 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Raid 13.64 11.11 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Table 11.   Percentages of Incidents by Year Per Type (Groupings)
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Grouping the incidents together by similar type highlights that the grouping of 
ambush, armed clash, etc. for both Sulu and Basilan is the most prevalent grouping of 
incidents in four out of eight years (50%) and three out of seven years (43%), 
respectively. These tables highlight that certain incident types simply are not as numerous 
compared to others; however, in these cases, the incidents that have low percentages are 
also those that either stand alone or are partnered with only one other incident. As 
discovered in tables 8 and 9, the surrender grouping, after a few years of prevalence, 
quickly diminishes; the opposite can be said for the ambush, armed clash, etc. grouping. 
From 2001 to 2007, this group’s percentage steadily climbs each year; although in 2008 
its percentage is not as high as in previous years, it does make sense as these incident 
types occurred in all preceding years. The other groupings that occur in 2008 also follow 
this pattern as each of these groupings experienced a number of incidents in a majority of 
years. From looking at these tables, security forces would be able to see which incident 
types occur most frequently and therefore, be able to predict which practices and 
operations to focus on.  
C. HOT SPOT ANALYSIS 
Of the 299 incidents that were initiated by the ASG, 180 took place on the island of Sulu, 
158 during the years 2001 to 2007 and 22 occurring in 2008. CrimeStat’s Hot Spot Mode 
routine was run on the 2001 to 2007 incidents and generated locations where incidents 





(Location in Decimal Degrees) 
Number of Incidents 
1 




Indanan                (5.99428, 
120.960286) 
9 




Talipao               (5.962007, 
121.09313) 
6 








Talipao               (5.979516, 
121.075123) 
4 
Parang               (5.970464, 
120.910145) 
4 
Jolo                  (6.053346, 
121.006827) 
4 
Maimbung            (5.950357, 
121.009857) 
4 
Table 12.   Top Ten Most Frequent Locations of ASG Incidents 
The resulting output from CrimeStat was imported into ArcGIS and generated the image 













(5) – Parang - 4 
(5) – Jolo - 4 (2) – Patikul - 9 (3) – Patikul - 6 
(3) – Talipao – 6 
(4) – Indanan - 5 
(2) – Indanan - 9 
(1) – Jolo - 12 
(5) – Maimbung - 4 
(5) – Talipao - 4 
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Of the top 10 locations for 2001–2007 incidents, only one location saw at least 
one incident happen in 2008; the location in Patikul (121.089826, 6.043645 decimal 
degrees) that was the scene of nine incidents from 2001 to 2007, saw two incidents occur 
in 2008. The overlay of 2008 incidents on the top ten hot spots for Sulu from 2001 to 















As shown in Figure 2, two outlying incidents occurred in 2008: one, in Luuk 
involved harassment by the ASG; and the other, abduction, occurred in Panglima Estino. 
However, these two incidents appear to be just that, outliers. The harassment that happens 
in Luuk is the only incident the municipality saw over the eight-year period and out of the 
incidents in the neighboring municipalities (Old Panamao and Kalingalan Caluang), Old 
Panamao was the only municipality where harassments occurred, but these incidents 
happened three years previously. The abduction that took place in Panglima Estino was 
only the third incident seen in the municipality (2001 and 2007 were the years of the 
other incidents) and the only abduction. However, unlike the harassment in Luuk, this 
abduction was the only abduction that occurred within the neighboring region. Although 
the incidents were rather isolated from others, in 2008, the incidents that did occur tended 
to be either an abduction or harassment (ten and seven out of twenty-two, respectively). 
Of the 119 remaining ASG-initiated incidents, 78 took place on the island of 
Basilan, 63 from 2001 to 2007 and 15 during 2008. CrimeStat’s Mode routine was run on 
this set of data and the top locations are identified in Table 13. 
Rank 
Municipality  
(Location in Decimal Degrees) 
Number of Incidents 


























Table 13.   Top Seven Most Frequent Locations of ASG Incidents 
The results from Basilan were input into ArcGIS and are depicted in Figure 3. 
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Figure 3.  Top Seven Locations for Incidents on Basilan, According to 
CrimeStat 
Just like the 2008 incidents that occurred in Sulu, one location, the location in the 
Basilan municipality of Lamitan (122.104057, 6.648478 Decimal Degrees) that was the 
site of 3 incidents during the 2001 to 2007 years, was the scene of an incident during 
2008. The overlay of 2008 incidents on the top ten hot spots for Basilan from 2001 to 





(3) – Lantawan - 3 
(2) – Tuburan - 4 
(3) – Sumisip - 3 
(1) – Sumisip - 5 
(3) – Tipo-Tipo - 3 
(3) – Lamitan - 3 
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Figure 4.  Basilan 2008 Incidents Compared to 2001–2007 CrimeStat Hot 
Spots 
For both of these islands, running CrimeStat’s Hot Spot Analysis routine on 
2001–2007 incidents and overlaying the 2008 incidents on the resulting output reveals 
that only one of the identified top hot spots is the location of an incident in 2008. For 
Sulu this means that 8% (1/12) of 2008 locations are the same location as a top hot spot 
and for Basilan 14% (1/7) locations are the same location for a top hot spot. However, for 
Sulu, if all CrimeStat-generated Hot Spots are included, this increases the likelihood a 
2008 incident location will be the same as a 2001–2007 hot spot (25% or 4/12).  
In both Sulu and Basilan, most of the incidents occurred nearby other incidents 
during 2008, but some of the 2008 incidents appeared to be more isolated than others. 
Whereas in Sulu where the two outlying incidents really were quite isolated, the 
“isolated” incidents on Basilan (Sumisip and Tipo-Tipo) were located near other incident 
sites from between 2001 to 2007. The isolated incidents on Basilan differed slightly from 
those that occurred on Sulu. Both municipalities saw more total incidents throughout the 
2001–2007 period, fourteen and eight, respectively. The 2008 incident in Sumisip was an 







ambushes in 2001, 2004, and 2005; only encounters outnumber the number of ambushes. 
The 2008 incident in Tipo-Tipo was a harassment, but not the first the municipality had 
seen; six harassments occurred the year before throughout the municipality. Compared to 
the incidents that took place on Sulu, the type of incident that occurred in both Sumisip 
and Tipo-Tipo was more likely to occur. 
ArcGIS is also capable of conducting Hot Spot Analysis. However, unlike 
CrimeStat, which calculates a hot spot simply by counting how many incidents occur in 
the same location, ArcGIS’s Hot Spot Analysis utilizes the Getis-Ord Gi* statistic:  
This tool works by looking at each feature within the context of 
neighboring features. A feature with a high value is interesting but may 
not be a statistically significant hot spot. To be a statistically significant 
hot spot, a feature will have a high value and be surrounded by other 
features with high values as well. The local sum for a feature and its 
neighbors is compared proportionally to the sum of all features; when the 
local sum is very different from the expected local sum, and when that 
difference is too large to be the result of random change, a statistically 
significant z-score results.47 
The resulting z-scores and their associated p-values tell the user whether or not a 
spot has a high or low cluster spatially; the higher the z-score (positive) or the lower the 
z-score (negative), the more intense the clustering of either high or low values.  
Both the incidents that occurred on Sulu and Basilan during the years 2001 to 
2007 were run through the ArcGIS Hot Spot Analysis tool. The resulting outputs are 
displayed in Figures 5 and 6. 
 
                                                 




Figure 5.  ArcGIS Hot Spot Analysis of 2001–2007 Abu Sayyaf Group Sulu Incidents 
 
Legend 
99% Confidence Cold Spot 
95% Confidence Cold Spot 
90% Confidence Cold Spot 
Not Significant Spot 
90% Confidence Hot Spot 
95% Confidence Hot Spot 
99% Confidence Hot Spot 
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Figure 6.  ArcGIS Hot Spot Analysis of 2001–2007 Abu Sayyaf Group Basilan Incidents 
 
Legend 
99% Confidence Cold Spot 
95% Confidence Cold Spot 
90% Confidence Cold Spot 
Not Significant Spot 
90% Confidence Hot Spot 
95% Confidence Hot Spot 
99% Confidence Hot Spot 
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Just as with the CrimeStat Hot Spot Analysis Outputs, the results of the ArcGIS 
Hot Spot Analysis had the 2008 incident data overlayed to determine whether or not any 
hot or cold spot based on the data from 2001 to 2007 was the site of an incident in 2008. 





Figure 7.  2008 Incidents Overlaid on ArcGIS Hot Spot Analysis of 2001–2007 Sulu Incidents 
 
Legend 
99% Confidence Cold Spot 
95% Confidence Cold Spot 
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2008 Incident 
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Figure 8.  2008 Incidents Overlaid on ArcGIS Hot Spot Analysis of 2001–2007 
Basilan Incidents 
This time only the island of Sulu has its one identified hot spot (90% Confidence) 
serve as a repeat location for 2008 incidents. Like the hot spot identified in CrimeStat, the 
ArcGIS-generated hot spot is located in the municipality of Patikul (121.039413, 
6.057583 Decimal Degrees), but it is not the same hot spot, though this hot spot also is 
the location of two 2008 incidents. Unlike Sulu, Basilan’s one identified hot spot, located 
in Tuburan (Coordinates: 122.239598, 6.630038 Decimal Degrees), is not the location of 
a 2008 incident. The only overlap occurs at a location in Lamitan (Coordinates: 
122.104057, 6.648478 Decimal Degrees) that was ruled as not statistically a cold or hot 
spot by ArcGIS; though it is the same previously identified hot spot in CrimeStat.    
Out of the 12 locations that experienced an incident on Sulu in 2008, seven (58%) 
of them occur in locations that were not previously the site of an attack during the 2001 
to 2007 period (5/12 or 42% occurred at a previous site). Like Sulu, out of seven sites 
that experienced an incident in 2008 on Basilan, only one of the sites (14%) was a 
location that saw an incident during 2001 to 2007. Compared to having absolutely no 
Legend 
99% Confidence Cold Spot 
95% Confidence Cold Spot 
90% Confidence Cold Spot 
Not Significant Spot 
90% Confidence Hot Spot 
95% Confidence Hot Spot 
99% Confidence Hot Spot 
2008 Incident 
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knowledge, these percentages, although low (especially Basilan’s), give rise to the 
examination of more information to help predict terrorist actions. 
Compared to ArcGIS, the CrimeStat software’s mode routine identified more hot 
spots where it would be likely to see future activity. For CrimeStat both Sulu and Basilan 
saw one hot spot serve as the location of a 2008 incident resulting in a low percentage of 
successful prediction for the two cases (8% and 14%, respectively). ArcGIS’s hot spot 
analysis identifies only one statistically significant hot spot for both Sulu and Basilan, 
classifying the majority of sites from 2001–2007 as either not statistically significant or 
as a cold spot with varying degrees of confidence. As ArcGIS only identifies one hot spot 
for each island, and only the hot spot in the municipality of Patikul on Sulu has an 
incident occur there in 2008, the islands have the resulting percentages from whether or 
not an identified hot spot was the site of a future incident: 100% for Sulu and 0% for 
Basilan; together the two average out to a 50% ability for ArcGIS hot spot analysis to 
accurately identify possible future locations for incidents. Again, ignoring the identified 
hot spots and simply looking at what percentage of locations that served as an incident 
site from 2001–2007 again was the site of an incident in 2008 generates the following 
numbers: 42% for Sulu (five locations out of twelve 2008 locations saw an incident in the 
preceding years) and 14% for Basilan (one location out of the seven 2008 locations saw 





















































Yes 1 - Sulu 100.00 










No 1 - Basilan 0.00 
Patikul -   
9 Incidents 
Yes             
Talipao -   
6 Incidents 
No   
    
  
Patikul -   
6 Incidents 
No   
    
  
Indanan -   
5 Incidents 
No   
    
  
Talipao -   
4 Incidents 
No   
    
  
Parang -   
4 Incidents 
No   
    
  
Jolo -      4 
Incidents 
No   





No   
    
  
Sumisip -  
5 Incidents 
No   
    
  
Tuburan -  
4 Incidents 
No   
    
  
Lamitan -  
3 Incidents 
Yes   
    
  
Lamitan -  
3 Incidents 
No   





No   
    
  
Sumisip -  
3 Incidents 
No   




No             
Table 14.   Summary of Hot Spot Analysis from CrimeStat and ArcGIS 
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Although the resulting percentages for successfully identifying locations for future 
incidents are low, they still indicate that there is some information that can be gathered 
from this type of analysis, and therefore, hot spot analysis should not be easily dismissed 
from the intelligence process. However, these software packages take into account 
neither the total number of incidents nor the population of the area being analyzed when 
identifying hot spots, something that would help put all the studied municipalities on an 
equal level; this can be accomplished by normalizing the incident data.  
D. INCIDENT NORMALIZATION 
Another method for interpreting the data for both Sulu and Basilan was in taking 
the total number of incidents that occurred in each municipality and normalizing that 
number by either the total number of incidents that occurred on the entire island or by the 
population of the municipality. The total number of incidents in each municipality and for 
the entire island as well as the resultant normalization value and category for both 2001 
to 2007 and 2008 for the island of Sulu are shown in Table 15 and depicted in Figures 9 
and 10. The different categorization levels for the normalization values are drawn out in 





of Incidents in 
Municipality:       
2001 - 2007 
Total Number 
of Incidents 
in Sulu:      
2001 - 2007 
Normalization 
Value         




of Incidents in 
Municipality:       
2008 
Total Number of 
Incidents in 







0.1899 5 1 
22 
0.04545 2 
Jolo 23 0.1456 4 0 0.000 1 
Kalingalan 
Caluang 
4 0.02532 2 0 0.000 1 
Luuk 0 0.000 1 1 0.04545 2 
Maimbung 20 0.1266 4 4 0.1818 3 
Old 
Panamao 
7 0.0443 3 0 0.000 1 
Panglima 
Estino 
2 0.0127 2 1 0.04545 2 
Parang 10 0.06329 3 1 0.04545 2 
Patikul 32 0.2025 5 13 0.5909 4 
Talipao 30 0.1899 5 1 0.04545 2 






Value Range:  






Value Range: 2008 
Category 
Color 
1 0.000 Blue 1 0.000 Blue 
2 0.00010 – 0.02532 Green 2 0.00010 – 0.04545 Green 
3 0.02533 – 0.06329 Yellow 3 0.04546 – 0.1818 Yellow 
4 0.06330 – 0.1456 Orange 4 0.1819 – 0.5909 Red 
5 0.1457 – 0.2025 Red  
Table 16.   Normalization Category Levels 
In this thesis, the normalization category that is red in color (Category 4 or 5 
depending) highlights a strong or high value and the blue normalization category 
(Category 1) is indicative of a weak or low result.  
 




Figure 10.  Normalization of Municipality Incidents by Total Sulu Incidents: 
2008 
Comparing the normalization values of each municipality’s incidents by the 
island’s total number of incidents from 2001 to 2007 to the values for 2008, there are two 
consistencies observed: Patikul and Panglima Estino. In both instances Patikul falls in the 
highest normalization value, which corresponds to this region experiencing the highest 
number of incidents in both time periods; Panglima Estino’s normalization values keep 
the municipality solidly in category 2 in both year groupings. In both cases, these can be 
considered as important pieces of information for security forces; from this analysis they 
would identify Patikul as an area to watch closely as it sees the most activity and 
Panglima Estino sees consistently less activity, where perhaps they would not focus as 
much attention. There is only one municipality that’s normalization value increases from 
the 2001 to 2007 time to 2008: Luuk; this municipality only experiences one incident 
during all eight years, which occurred in 2008, the second time frame. The other eight 
municipalities all decrease in normalization category, most by a level of one, though Jolo 
does drop from level (4) to level (1) when it experiences zero attacks in the 2008 year.   
The total number of incidents in each municipality, and for the entire island as 
well as the resultant normalization value and category for both 2001 to 2007 and 2008 for 
the island of Basilan, are shown in Table 17 and depicted in Figures 11 and 12. As the 
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normalization values for each category have changed for the island of Basilan, new 






of Incidents in 
Municipality:       
2001 - 2007 
Total Number 
of Incidents in 
Basilan:      
2001 - 2007 
Normalization 
Value         




of Incidents in 
Municipality:       
2008 
Total Number 
of Incidents in 








0.1587 4 0 
15 
0.00000 1 
Lamitan 12 0.1905 4 1 0.06667 2 
Lantawan 10 0.1587 4 0 0.00000 1 
Maluso 2 0.03175 2 0 0.00000 1 
Sumisip 15 0.2381 5 1 0.06667 2 
Tipo-Tipo 8 0.1270 3 4 0.26667 3 
Tuburan 6 0.0952 3 9 0.60000 4 




Value Range:  






Value Range: 2008 
Category 
Color 
1 0.000 Blue 1 0.000 Blue 
2 0.00010 – 0.03175 Green 2 0.00010 – 0.06667 Green 
3 0.03176 – 0.1270 Yellow 3 0.06668 – 0.2667 Yellow 
4 0.1271 – 0.1905 Orange 4 0.2668 – 0.6000 Red 
5 0.1906 – 0.2381 Red  




Due to the small number of values utilized in determining the normalization 
values in 2008, there are only four normalization categories compared to the five 
categories from the 2001 to 2007 range.   
 




Figure 12.  Normalization of Municipality Incidents by Total Basilan Incidents: 
2008 
For Basilan, like Sulu, the island highlights a consistency from the 2001 to 2007 
value to the 2008 value: Tipo-Tipo, the municipality remains in the yellow category in 
both phases, the third from the bottom. Beyond this municipality, the others switch 
normalization categories seemingly at random.   
Beyond comparing the values from the 2001–2007 time period to those that 
occurred in 2008, each year can be compared to the others and the average of those years. 
The average of the years 2001–2007 is compared to 2008 in order to determine whether 
any pattern from year-to-year emerges. The yearly normalization numbers for each year 
and the averages are displayed in Table 19.  
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Sulu Number of Incidents Occurred in Municipality / Normalization by Year’s Total Incidents 




44 10 19 10 27 31 17 22.57143 22 2.597402597 
Municipality   
Indanan 
3 4 2 0 11 6 4 4.285714 1 328.57 
0.06818 0.4 0.10526 0 0.40741 0.19355 0.23529 0.201385 0.04545 343.05 
Jolo 
5 0 3 1 0 14 0 3.285714 0   
0.11364 0 0.15789 0.1 0 0.45161 0 0.117592 0   
Kalingalan 
Caluang 
2 1 0 0 0 0 1 0.571429 0   
0.04545 0.1 0 0 0 0 0.05882 0.029183 0   
Luuk 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 100.00 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.04545 100.00 
Maimbung 
5 0 2 4 4 4 1 2.857143 4 28.57 
0.11364 0 0.10526 0.4 0.14815 0.12903 0.05882 0.136415 0.18182 24.97 
Old Panamao 
2 0 2 0 3 0 0 1 0   
0.04545 0 0.10526 0 0.11111 0 0 0.037404 0   
Panglima 
Estino 
1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0.285714 1 71.43 
0.02273 0 0 0 0 0 0.05882 0.01165 0.04545 74.37 
Parang 
0 1 0 1 4 0 4 1.428571 1 42.86 
0 0.1 0 0.1 0.14815 0 0.23529 0.083349 0.04545 83.37 
Patikul 
7 4 7 4 3 5 2 4.571429 13 64.84 
0.15909 0.4 0.36842 0.4 0.11111 0.16129 0.11765 0.245366 0.59091 58.48 
Talipao 
19 0 3 0 2 2 4 4.285714 1 328.57 
0.43182 0 0.15789 0 0.07407 0.06452 0.23529 0.137657 0.04545 202.84 
Table 19.   Sulu Island-Wide and Municipality-Level Normalization Values by 
Year 
For Sulu, the average number of incidents per year based on the 2001–2007 
numbers was just over 22.5; comparing this to the total number of incidents in 2008, 22, 
yields a percent difference between the two of fewer than 3%, meaning that the number 
of incidents in 2008 follows the number of incidents one would expect to occur. 
However, other than providing information toward the grand picture, this result would 
not tell security forces where to possibly expect future attacks just that in general they 
should expect about twenty-two attacks to occur in a given year. While the total number 
of incidents for the entire island is consistent with the yearly average, the same is not true 
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for each municipality. The municipality with the lowest percent difference for both the 
total number of incidents and the normalization of those incidents by the island’s total 
incidents is Maimbung, but even those values are high, 28.57% and 24.97%, respectively; 
the other municipalities’ values range from 58.48% to as high as 343.05%. These 
resulting percentages demonstrates that like the 2001–2007 total values compared to the 
2008 values, using the averages from the same time period and comparing to the 2008 
values produces very little information to go on, though the total number of anticipated 
incidents may be able to be predicted. 
Basilan Number of Incidents Occurred in Municipality / Normalization by Year's Total Incidents 






27 9 8 6 4 0 9 9 15 40 
Municipality   
Isabela 
2 3 2 2 0 0 1 1.428571 0   
0.07407 0.333333 0.25 0.33333 0 0 0.11111 0.157407 0   
Lamitan 
10 0 0 1 0 0 1 1.714286 1 71.43 
0.37037 0 0 0.16667 0 0 0.11111 0.092593 0.06667 38.89 
Lantawan 
4 2 3 0 0 0 1 1.428571 0   
0.14815 0.222222 0.375 0 0 0 0.11111 0.122354 0   
Maluso 
1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0.285714 0   
0.03704 0 0 0.16667 0 0 0 0.029101 0   
Sumisip 
5 4 1 2 3 0 0 2.142857 1 114.29 
0.18519 0.444444 0.125 0.33333 0.75 0 0 0.262566 0.06667 293.85 
Tipo-Tipo 
2 0 0 0 0 0 6 1.142857 4 71.43 
0.07407 0 0 0 0 0 0.66667 0.10582 0.26667 60.32 
Tuburan 
3 0 2 0 1 0 0 0.857143 9 90.48 
0.11111 0 0.25 0 0.25 0 0 0.087302 0.6 85.45 
Table 20.   Basilan Island-Wide and Municipality Level Normalization Values 
by Year 
Like the average values for Sulu, the average values for Basilan based on total 
incident number and the normalization values, does not yield results that appear to be 
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helpful in the prediction of incident numbers in 2008, for either the island as a whole or 
for each municipality.  
The other method of normalizing the incident number is by the population of each 
municipality. The total number of incidents occurring in the municipality, the population 
of the municipality, and the resultant value are displayed in Tables 21 and 22. 
Municipality 
Total Number 









Indanan 30 53425 0.0005615 
Jolo 23 87998 0.0002614 
Kalingalan 
Caluang 
4 22688 0.0001763 
Luuk 0 38819 0.0000000 
Maimbung 20 24982 0.0008006 
Old Panamao 7 35906 0.0001950 
Panglima 
Estino 
2 21443 0.0000933 
Parang 10 54994 0.0001818 
Patikul 32 34396 0.0009303 
Talipao 30 73015 0.0004109 













Isabela 10 73032 0.0001369 
Lamitan 12 58709 0.0002044 
Lantawan 10 27487 0.0003638 
Maluso 2 31054 0.0000644 
Sumisip 15 51712 0.0002901 
Tipo-Tipo 8 48284 0.0001657 
Tuburan 6 42550 0.0001410 
Table 22.   Normalization Values of Basilan Municipalities Based on 2001 to 
2007 Incidents 
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The same level of interpretation was done for the municipalities and the events 
that occurred in them during 2008; the results are shown in Tables 23 and 24.  
Municipality 
Total Number 









Indanan 1 53425 0.0000187 
Jolo 0 87998 0.0000000 
Kalingalan 
Caluang 
0 22688 0.0000000 
Luuk 1 38819 0.0000258 
Maimbung 4 24982 0.0001601 
Old Panamao 0 35906 0.0000000 
Panglima 
Estino 
1 21443 0.0000466 
Parang 1 54994 0.0000182 
Patikul 13 34396 0.0003780 
Talipao 1 73015 0.0000137 













Isabela 0 73032 0.0000000 
Lamitan 1 58709 0.0000170 
Lantawan 0 27487 0.0000000 
Maluso 0 31054 0.0000000 
Sumisip 1 51712 0.0000193 
Tipo-Tipo 4 48284 0.0000828 
Tuburan 9 42550 0.0002115 
Table 24.   Normalization Values of Basilan Municipalities Based on 2008 
Incidents 
In order to compare the normalization values from 2001–2007 to the values from 
2008, the normalization values were divided into five categories. The categories were 
























Table 25.   Normalization Categories 
The resulting comparison of normalization values from 2001–2007 and 2008 for 











Indanan 0.000561535 4 0.0000187 2 
Jolo 0.00026137 2 0.0000000 1 
Kalingalan 
Caluang 
0.000176305 2 0.0000000 1 
Luuk 0.0000000 1 0.0000258 2 
Maimbung 0.000800576 5 0.0001601 4 
Old Panamao 0.000194953 2 0.0000000 1 
Panglima 
Estino 
0.0000933 2 0.0000466 3 
Parang 0.000181838 2 0.0000182 2 
Patikul 0.000930341 5 0.0003780 5 
Talipao 0.000410874 3 0.0000137 2 





Figure 13.  Sulu 2001–2007 Incidents Normalized by Municipality Population 
 
Figure 14.  Sulu 2008 Incidents Normalized by Municipality Population 
Municipality 
Normalization Value 







Isabela 0.0001369 3 0.0000000 1 
Lamitan 0.0002044 4 0.0000170 2 
Lantawan 0.0003638 5 0.0000000 1 
Maluso 0.0000644 2 0.0000000 1 
Sumisip 0.0002901 5 0.0000193 3 
Tipo-Tipo 0.0001657 3 0.0000828 4 
Tuburan 0.0001410 3 0.0002115 5 
Table 27.   Comparison of Basilan Normalization Categories 
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Figure 15.  Basilan 2001–2007 Incidents Normalized by Municipality 
Population 
 
Figure 16.  Basilan 2008 Incidents Normalized by Municipality Population 
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When the figures for each island for the 2001 to 2007 incidents are compared to 
the same island’s figure for 2008, some consistancy is observed. For instance, for Sulu, 
Patikul once again remains in the highest normalization category (5) and Parang remains 
in the second lowest normalization category (2). Again, this is bit of information could 
prove useful to security forces in planning operations and patrols, for they could see 
where activity is consistently high and where it is lower. However, out of the eight 
remaining municipalities, only one changes its normalization category by more than one 
(Indanan – 4 to 2). As for Basilan, none of the seven municipalities maintain their 
original normalization category, and five out of the seven change normalization 
categories by two or more levels. 
If the normalization values by population for each year and each municipality on 
both islands are averaged and compared to the actual values for 2008, like the percent 
errors obtained from the normalization of incidents by total incidents, these percent errors 
are large in number, ranging from 28.57%–328.57%. 
Overall, the results of utilizing geographic profiling techniques on the incident 
data for Sulu and Basilan indicate potential for being useful in the determination of where 
future incidents could occur; however, further analysis on different pieces of data is 
required in order to determine whether these techniques could aid in future prediction 
efforts. Perhaps, with different data sets, there lies the possibility of utilizing more 
complex geographic profiling techniques that were not feasible with this thesis’ data, 
which could provide more predictive information and therefore, more clear-cut results. 
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V. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
A. DISCUSSION 
Utilizing statistical analysis, CrimeStat, and ArcGIS, the results of utilizing 
geographic profiling techniques yielded an assortment of results, some useful, and other 
results not. 
From the statistical analysis conducted, the results for the two islands of Sulu and 
Basilan tended to contradict each other, meaning that there was not much consistency 
between the islands, at least when it came to predicting whether an incident would occur 
within a particular area in the future. While municipalities on the island of Sulu were 
more likely to experience a 2008 incident if they experienced an incident in more of the 
seven years preceding 2008, the opposite held true in Basilan where a municipality was 
more likely to be the location of a 2008 incident if they experienced incidents in three or 
fewer preceding years. In looking at the likelihood of a particular type of incident 
occurring in Sulu and Basilan, the two islands tend to share more in common with one 
another because if the island experienced a particular type of incident in three or more out 
of the seven preceding years, approximately two-thirds of the time, they would 
experience that type of incident again in 2008. For those incidents that occurred in more 
than three years leading up to 2008, but did not actually occur in 2008, these types of 
incidents all occurred in 2004 or before, never after. However, when looking at the 2008 
incidents themselves, Sulu’s incidents tended to follow the pattern that if a particular type 
of incident occurred in multiple years, it was more likely to occur again in 2008; but in 
Basilan only a third of the 2008 incident types occurred in three or more years. Again, 
inconsistencies between the two islands make it difficult to develop an actual prediction.  
From CrimeStat, the Hot Spot Analysis reveals the locations that experienced the 
most incidents over a seven year period. However, in terms of prediction value, for both 
Sulu and Basilan, this analysis did not contribute much. The generated hot spots tended to 
not serve as the location of an incident in 2008; only fifteen percent (or less) of the hot 
spots saw an incident occur again in 2008. While CrimeStat’s Hot Spot Analysis provides 
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a slight indication of where a future incident would likely occur, the Hot Spot Analysis 
conducted by ArcGIS does not fare much better. On both islands, the model only 
generates one hot spot location, more often than not; the locations of incidents from 2001 
to 2007 were categorized as being not significant of a spot, though in a few instances the 
sites were identified as cold spots. Of the sites identified as hot spots, only on Sulu does a 
2008 incident occur at the same location as a previously identified hot spot. Even when 
looking at the incidents as a whole, the percentage of 2008 incidents that occur in 
previously attacked locations, only reaches forty-two percent for Sulu and fourteen 
percent for Basilan, percentages that are not high enough to help serve a predictive 
function. 
The predictive ability of incident normalization, when looking at the incidents in 
terms of their total numbers from 2001–2007 for each municipality and normalizing by 
total incident number for the entire island, provided little information. Most of the 
municipalities on both islands see a reduction in their normalization category, though 
three municipalities maintain their level and one, Tuburan, actually increases. The same 
basically holds true when the incidents that occurred from 2001–2007 are normalized by 
the 2000 population of the municipality. When the 2001–2007 incidents are averaged 
instead of simply being combined, a bit more information can be extracted. For both 
islands, the expected number of incidents in total for each island is roughly similar, 
though it is much better for Sulu than Basilan, meaning that authorities could at least 
begin to predict how many incidents in total the island should expect in a given year. 
Unfortunately, on the municipality level, the numbers vary on a large scale from the 
anticipated values, once again decreasing the predictive capability of the method.  
Overall, these results do not speak highly of the predictive nature of geographic 
profiling techniques; however, while the resulting percentages were not very high, the 
fact that most of these methods of analysis produce even a result at all means that they 
have future application. The process intelligence analysts and law enforcement officials 
go through currently to predict likely locations of where terrorists and criminals attack 
and operate involves multiple methods, which all together aid in the determination of the 
most likely areas; these geographic profiling techniques provide yet another level of 
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analysis to help in this determination. Perhaps when added into several existing methods, 
information can be revealed that would have previously gone undetected. 
The results of this thesis may simply highlight that for all the similarities shared 
between serial criminals and terrorists, the two entities are just too different from one 
another for a technique that works on one to work for the other. Terrorists tend to be 
motivated by an ideology and choose their targets in order to generate fear among the 
population and force the government to take action against a perceived injustice held by 
the terrorists, while serial criminals and serial killers or rapists in particular tend to target 
people who fit a certain description in order to act out anger on someone who has 
wronged them previously, without a further goal of soliciting a government response. Of 
course, the largest difference, which makes determining the location of a terrorist base of 
operations difficult, is that serial criminals tend to be an individual, but with a terrorist 
organization, it is challenging to pick out one individual so instead, the focus turns 
toward applying efforts meant for one person to an entire group.  However, this thesis 
focused on the prediction of where a terrorist organization will strike next and not where 
they operate from; even though this is the case, due to the underlying differences between 
an individual committing crimes and an entire group conducting attacks, it may be 
enough to make the application not feasible. Once again, further analysis is required in 
order to determine whether this feasibility exists; from this thesis, the process appears 
promising.  
B. LIMITATIONS 
There are several limitations to this study, particularly in terms of data and its 
ability to be incorporated into the analysis packages. The data utilized in this thesis came 
from one source, meaning that potentially not all incidents were included in the data set. 
The data itself had so much information, in terms of numbers, that it had to be reduced 
down to one particular group, mostly in order to keep the incidents that occurred in the 
same general area so that the analysis was not conducted throughout the entire southern 
Philippines. The incident data, even prior to reduction, only included so much 
information about a particular attack, leading to confusion about what each type of 
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incident had occurred. Beyond the possible confusion introduced by the data itself, there 
were aspects of the data that did not mesh well with the programs utilized. The CrimeStat 
software was not able to be utilized to its fullest potential because of the data inputted 
into it; only one method of analysis was able to be run. Even in ArcGIS the data ran into 
problems when the software processes required more information than available. These 
issues may not have arisen if different geographic profiling software, such as Dragnet and 
Rigel Analyst, but as CrimeStat was the only program easily obtained; the other software 
packages were not used. Lastly, this thesis only focused on the one data set; there is more 
room for further analysis of data to be run through these programs. 
C. CONCLUSIONS 
The utilization of geographic profiling in the hunt for serial criminals has found 
success for law enforcement agencies. Although it seems difficult, there is room available 
for incorporation into the analysis process utilized by intelligence personnel to predict 
where future terrorist activity could occur. Even though this thesis analyzed a limited 
amount of data, it still provided key pieces of information from which observations could 
be made by security forces in the Philippines that have the potential to help aid in 
planning either operations or security patrols in regions where the Abu Sayyaf Group 
operates.   
Geographic profiling is a newer method, meaning that as time passes, 
improvements will be made to existing techniques that will only help the field grow. 
While this thesis has not been able to show that geographic profiling techniques are the 
next “silver bullet” in the prediction of terrorist attacks, it has illustrated the possibilities 
the method offers in helping to further analysis. This thesis only provided one attempt of 
applying existing geographic profiling methods to terrorist incident data, future efforts to 
explore the possibility of geographic profiling terror attacks and terrorists need to be run 
on several different types of data and on several different scales of data.  
These future efforts could include many possibilities; it will take time to 
determine what sort of data and how much data is required in order to be most compatible 
with the geographic profiling software utilized. First, perhaps there is an aspect of 
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CrimeStat that was not compatible with the data used; running the same data through 
different software packages could yield other results, ones that may be able to provide a 
more in-depth picture. Even just from the complete data set utilized in this thesis there 
were several different groups whose actions could be analyzed; perhaps groups such as 
the Moro Islamic Liberation Front and their greater number of incidents as well as their 
more spread out nature provide a better set of data to study. On the other hand, many 
current applications of geographic profiling by law enforcement agencies are restricted to 
city-level analysis and in running analysis over an entire island, the area was simply too 
large to be accurately interpreted; therefore, finding a portion of the data which is great in 
number and concentrated around a city or established place would enable the software to 
provide a better analysis of incident data. The incident data from this thesis also spanned 
a large period of time, eight years; again, this could have been too much for the programs 
utilized and because the hot spot analysis was run on a seven year period, important 
aspects about the data and the progression of incidents was missed. Beyond the data set 
studied in this thesis, there is a wealth of other incident data sets that could be analyzed in 
order to determine if a particular type of information is more suited for application of 
geographic profiling techniques. This thesis serves merely as a beginning for future and 
more in-depth efforts into determining whether geographic profiling is applicable to the 
intelligence process in the search for terrorists; however, this thesis has been able to 
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